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Båda parter måste dock vara beredda till uppoffring-
ar. För historikerns del gäller det framför allt att bli 
uppmärksam på de egna framställningsformerna: vilka 
gränser de sätter, och vilka av dessa gränser som är vä-
sentliga att upprätthålla. Filmaren, å sin sida, måste 
förstå att “återgivningar av historien i film kräver en 
medveten omarbetning av de ‘naturliga’ formerna av 
filmiskt berättande”, för att tala med filmvetaren Wil-
liam Guynn. Utsträcker vi resonemanget även till 
antropologin hägrar ett brett akademiskt samarbete 
som förenar samhällsvetenskapliga, humanistiska och 
konstnärliga perspektiv – och en möjlighet för filmen 
att ta ett nytt steg i sitt utforskande av den mänskliga 
tillvaron. 
Men vi gör alltjämt klokt i att hålla Kracauers metafor 
i åtankte. Vad den påminner oss om är att den yttre 
resan – ut i världen eller in i arkiven – alltid måste 
motsvaras av en inre, att det praktiska också inbegri-
per det existentiella. Det är denna aspekt som vi måste 
framhäva om vi vill ge idén om en vetenskaplig dis-
ciplin en relevans som överskrider den i snäv mening 
veten-skapliga. Till Martin Wiklunds analys av histo-
rikern som domare, vittne och advokat vill jag därför 
foga en sista anmärkning: framför allt måste vi ständigt 
sätta oss själva i den åtalades ställe. Närhelst vi närmar 
oss det förflutna får vi aldrig glömma att det lika gärna 
kunde ha varit vi.
Denna essä är tillägnad Eva-Lena Dahl.
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The 1968 American feature film A Married Couple tells 
the story of the daily life of a white middle class Ame-
rican couple. In “reality” the film is based on 70 hours 
of footage shot over ten weeks during the summer of 
1968, then edited down to 96 minutes. Both film style 
and production method relies on the observational 
“fly-on-the-wall” mode of documentary filmmaking of 
the early 1960s. Still, the filmmaker Allan King emp-
hasised the issue of performance:
One has to be very, very clear. Billy and Antoinette 
in the film are not Billy and Antoinette Edwards, the 
couple who exist and live at 323 Rushton Road. They 
are characters, images on celluloid in a film drama. 
To say that they are in any other sense true, other 
than being true to our experience of the world and 
people we have known and ourselves, is philosophical 
nonsense. There is no way ninety minutes in a film 
of Billy and Antoinette can be the same as the actual 
real life of Billy and Antoinette.1
As much research on reality television has shown, the 
important issue is not questions of “truth”, “reality”, 
“authenticity” or “performance”, issues which docu-
mentary research of the last two decades has already 
questioned, deconstructed and, sometimes, demo-
lished, but rather what this “passion for the real” ac-
1. Alan Rosenthal, “A Married Couple”, in Alan Rosenthal, ed., The 
New Documentary in Action: A Casebook in Film Making (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1971), 32, quoted in Zoë Druick, “A 
Married Couple: Reality TV’s progenitor turns 40”, FlowTV, vol. 
11, no. 6, 2010, http://flowtv.org/?p=4705.
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does not implies that both fiction and non-fiction is 
interchangeable, or that everything is fiction. As David 
Bordwell argues,
a fiction film is narrated through and through. Not just 
camera positions but also the arrangement of figures in 
space, not just cutting but also the movements executed 
by the actors, and not just zoom shots but also lines of 
dialogue – everything, including the solid environment 
and behaviours we detect, is produced by the film’s nar-
ration. That’s all we have to go on; we have no indepen-
dent access to the world portrayed on the screen.5
Although the most restricting production “bible”, 
in the legal documents of a reality television format, 
may regulate camera positions, cutting pace, camera 
framing, it can never control the arrangement of fi-
gures in space, actors’ movements or dialogue.6 If we 
leave questions of professional actors vs. “real people” 
behind, modes of work, labour relations and political 
economy becomes more important to discuss for itself 
and as conditions for authenticity and performance.
During the 1960s, as a response to criticism of so 
called “naïve” documentarism, and as a political re-
modelling of 1920s avant-garde, a more self-reflexive 
mode of documentaries helped creating a new form of 
truth-claim. The core of the argument was that if the 
audience not only were facing a story but at the same 
time a disclosure of how that story is constructed, it 
should help making the story more reliable and trust-
worthy. In Carl Plantinga’s words:
A reflexive film is one that does more than simply repre-
sent its subject – it also examines its own methods and 
the perspective of its producer(s).7
5. David Bordwell, Poetics of Cinema (New York & London: 
Routledge, 2008), 110.
6. Albert Moran with Justin Malbon, Understanding the Global TV 
Format (Bristol: Intellect, 2006), 60.
7. Carl R. Plantinga, Rhetoric and Representation in Nonfiction Film 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 214.
tually embodies.2 On the one hand reality television 
may grant access to “ordinary” people’s lives, way of 
behaviour and speech. On the other hand reality tele-
vision puts emphasis on everyday performance as well 
as how “today’s reality television naturalizes rather than 
questions the Social Darwinism of competitive capita-
lism and the governmentalized social context of neoli-
beralism that it exposes”.3 Or, combined, what Mark 
Andrejevic describes as “the work of being watched, a 
form of production wherein consumers are invited to 
sell access to their personal lives in a way not dissimilar 
to that in which they sell their labour power.”4
Appropriating reality television as a model, or il-
lustration, of blurred boundaries between fiction and 
non-fiction on a representational level, has consequen-
ces on the production level. Performing the “work 
of being watched” is of course also to be exposed to 
concerns of privacy, surveillance and control. But a 
metaphorical use of reality television does more than 
just discuss if there is a difference between fiction and 
non-fiction or if we live in a surveillance society. It ne-
cessarily invokes questions of work. The lure of reality 
television, as well as the passion for the real, is based 
on what has been called the “referential illusion”, the 
idea that telling a story is a rearrangement of a world 
in front of the camera. Undeniably this is close to the 
traditional definition of documentary narration; but it 
also invokes an interesting difference of both aesthetic 
and ethic relevance.
If narration is the only way in which we can access 
any other “world”, for example in front of a camera, 
concepts like “authenticity” and “performance”, so 
prevalent in discussions of reality television, becomes 
secondary to the modes of narration. This however 
2. For a comprehensive introduction to documentary film research, 
see Thomas Austin and Wilma de Jong, eds, Rethinking Documen-
tary: New Perspectives, New Practices (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 
2008).
3. Driuck.
4. Mark Andrejevic, Reality TV: The Work of being Watched (New York: 
Rowan and Littlefield, 2004), 6.
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This mode of production has been the most prestigious 
form of art film production the last couple of deca-
des, and in documentary contexts been considered the 
most “true” films. Plantinga presents some arguments 
against the (political) value of privileging reflexivity in 
documentary discourses. Non-fiction films have never 
been un-manipulated representations of reality becau-
se they both record and interpret reality. Thereby the 
distinction between recording and “creative” is a false 
contradiction since “techniques such as editing, music 
etc, are not fictional, but filmic techniques that can be 
used in both fiction and nonfiction films.”8 Adding to 
this, all films are in some sense always reflexive. The 
idea of the “suspension of disbelief ”, that is, the idea 
of the spectator being so involved, and so identifying 
him/herself with the story that s/he conflates the film 
with reality, is a theoretical construction which in fact 
very rarely comes through and only works momenta-
rily.9 It also creates a false distinction between an “ac-
tive” viewer of reflexive film and a “passive” viewer of 
realistic films:
The claim [from ideological formalism] is that realist 
documentaries have negative ideological effects, whereas 
politically reflexive documentaries encourage self-cons-
ciousness and educate the audience. [---] Such claims 
not only fail to distinguish between spectators on the 
basis of level of education or critical acumen, but they 
underestimate the degree to which most spectators are 
critical of what they see. If most spectators are dupes and 
simpletons, the need for reflexivity may exist (but never 
as panacea). If most are critical of what they see, re-
flexivity is less important. In either case, one could argue 
that media education is more vital than reflexivity as a 
strategy for encouraging critical viewing among specta-
tors. The savvy spectator does not require reflexivity to 
achieve a critical perspective.10
8. Ibid., 215.
9. Ibid., 215.
10. Ibid., 217.
Yet another argument is that it is impossible to be fully 
reflexive. Every aspect of the production cannot be re-
flected upon, so we still have to face selection, exclusi-
on and subjective choices. All aspects of the conditions 
of production might not even be known or understood 
by the producer. Not to mention that a reflexive act 
can also be a lie.11
A practical solution has been to create personal, 
subjective documentaries, implicitly arguing that if I 
am telling my story, including some self-referential and 
reflexive moments, the viewer is supposed to under-
stand that this is not an “objective truth”, but a “sub-
jective truth”. By being presented in a self-reflexive, 
self-referential way it is more likely more “true” than 
traditional realist documentaries or fiction.12 But the 
self-referential (or poetic in Roman Jacobson’s words) 
mode of communication (or speech), for example re-
presented by mediated expression of individuals th-
rough art or blogs, as 
performance of the self is just as coded, ‘theatrical’ and 
‘artistic’ in everyday life as it is in fine art; that sub-
jectivity links power and aesthetics in performance; 
and that there is an open channel of mutual influence 
among these different hierarchical levels of the overall 
cultural network (manifested for instance in ‘gossip’ me-
dia and celebrity culture, where the attention accorded 
to celebrities like Paris and Britney is focused on their 
personal lives, which for others constitute the condition 
of ordinariness).13
The production of ordinariness, which combines the 
private lives of celebrities with the public lives of “or-
dinary” people in reality television, has become a key 
11. Ibid, 217f.
12. For a thorough analysis on subjective documentaries, see Michael 
Renov, The Subject of Documentary (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004).
13. John Hartley, “Uses of YouTube – Digital Literacy and the Growth 
of Knowledge”, in Jean Burgess and Joshua Green, eds, YouTube: 
Online Video and Participatory Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 
137.
234
feature within reality programming. In contrast, stories 
told by “makers” usually presents a situation which is 
anything but ordinary. John Caldwell, in his analysis 
of Hollywood film and television production cultures, 
describes different modes of stories about production:
War stories [conflicts] and against-all-odds [perseve-
rance] allegories give to storytellers an earned mystique 
of technical mastery that is crucial for those who func-
tion as mentors in the industry’s stratified labor cast sys-
tem. These “narrative of authority” cultivate character 
through celebrations of work, suffering, and survival. 
A second set of trade narratives – the “genesis myths” 
– function less as celebrations of work (suffering at the 
production task and vocational survival) than as cele-
brations of an originating moment and artistic pedigree. 
Whereas survival at work establishes value in the first 
genre, acts of anointment or mentoring establish value 
in the second. In some ways, genesis myths function as 
the glue intended to create social cohesion in a work or 
trade group.14
Telling stories about production, either in interviews 
or talk shows, or included in self-reflexive works, are 
thus cultural performances with different functions 
and objectives. Interestingly, both reality television, 
particularly talk shows and docusoaps, and production 
narratives are thus often based on conflict, either as a 
way of structuring non-professional actors or as “war 
stories” of production. Still, there are some differences. 
As Laura Grindstaff argues in her study of reality tele-
vision production:
[Emotional labor], while not unique to talk shows or re-
ality shows, is nevertheless an outcome of working with 
“real” people rather than professional celebrities. Incor-
porating ordinary people into entertainment television 
14. John Thornton Caldwell, Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity 
and Critical Practice in Film and Television (Durham, NC and Lon-
don: Duke University Press, 2008), 47.
places enormous pressure on producers to simultaneously 
cultivate individual performers and to create/control the 
performative context – that is, to erect the conditions of 
possibility for maximizing emotional expressiveness.15
The ordinariness of the non-professional performers 
in talk shows and reality shows is often, from a (male 
middle-class intellectual) critical perspective descri-
bed as a form of freak show.16 From the performers’ 
point-of-view there are of course many reasons for 
participating, but if the “work of being watched” is 
better than ordinary work (or absence of work), it is 
not surprising that some people choose to capitalise on 
their own (special) ordinariness. From the production 
point-of-view the emotional labour of reality television 
participants becomes a way of capitalising on exposing 
its own production through the participants emotional 
labour. Thereby, reality television, rather than self-re-
flexive art, is closer to revealing the mechanisms of art 
or media production, by on the one hand having to be 
open with the complexity of the production process, 
and on the other hand relying on the audience expe-
rience of fiction dramas and “real” celebrity culture.
The flip side is of course the danger of exploitation, 
considering the class and gender aspects of reality te-
levision participation. Laura Grindstaff concludes her 
analysis by stressing the “gendered implications”:
for women are often linked, in the media and in the 
everyday lived reality, both to discourses of personal ex-
perience and “private” life, and to discourses of objecti-
fication by a putatively male gaze […]. Ultimately, in 
my view the problem with this sort of critique [of reality 
programming as an obsession “with minutes details of 
the self ”] is that it places the burden of social analysis on 
15. Laura Grindstaff, “Self-Serve Celebrity: The Production of Ordi-
nariness and Ordinariness of Production in Reality Television”, in 
Vicky Mayer, Miranda J. Banks and John Thornton Caldwell, eds, 
Production Studies: Cultural Studies of Media Industries (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2009), 80.
16. Jon Dovey, Freak Show: First Person Media and Factual Television 
(London: Pluto Press, 2000).
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the characters and storylines, rather than the how and 
why of their production.17
The problem is, referring back to Plantinga’s analysis, 
that the production itself never will be able to comple-
tely disclose the “how” and the “why” of its own pro-
duction mode, independent of the more or less fictio-
nal and codified narratives of the interests of everyone 
who tells their own stories.
Both film and television production, particularly 
in Hollywood, has always been a mix of illusion and 
reality. The Hollywood narrative (realistic) tradition 
is on the one hand based on the viewer’s psychologi-
cal experience of everyday situations, but on the other 
hand it always deals with fictional stories with fictional 
characters in fictional worlds. At the same time, Hol-
lywood has always been depended upon gossip media 
and celebrity culture for marketing purposes and as a 
way of engaging (with) the viewers.18 With the televi-
sion medium this balance between reality and illusion 
tipped over in favour of reality. Reality television has 
benefited from the trustworthiness of the television 
medium itself. As John Hartly argues:
Popular aesthetics, as opposed to artistic taste, was al-
ways an art-science interface. The idea that truth could 
be revealed by technological means, rather than shaping 
artistic vision that too often turned out to be manipu-
lative, was inherent in the popularity of the aestheti-
cization of science itself, via photos from outer space, 
wildlife documentaries on TV, or the entire dinosaur 
industry. The human condition, previously the domain 
of literature, painting, and the pursuit of “beauty” be-
came a province of science. Beauty was found in truth, 
not imagination.19
17. Grindstaff, 84.
18. See for example David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson and Janet 
Staiger, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of 
Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 
and Richard Dyer, Stars (London: BFI, 1979).
19. John Hartley, Television Truths (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 
252.
Hartley’s conclusion is far from Slavoj Žižek’s distinc-
tion between a 19th century belief in the utopian and 
the 20th century “passion for the real”, or “the thing 
itself ”.20 
People trusted truth more than they did art. They were 
right. And universities need to pursue this destiny, not 
pine for traditional “critical” (i.e. gentlemanly) values. 
Creativity and innovation, arts and sciences, knowledge 
and business, truth and imagination: they all need to get 
together, to modify each other’s genes, and multiply.21
Any “passion for the real”, that is, trust in the arts, is 
bound to fail. The detached self-reflexivity of tradi-
tional self-reflexive documentaries is so evidently ma-
nipulative. The emotional labour of reality television 
performers may be more “true”, and the production 
may reveal more of itself, but to the price of a new 
form of labour exploitation. Hartley’s call for a getting 
together of technology and artistic vision (or popular 
media and art) is certainly a nice idea. But, what unites 
the experience of both self-reflexive art and reality tele-
vision is that both production forms will have to meet 
in the “work of being watched”, a fact which brings us 
right back to square one and the question of who is 
watching who.
If self-reflexive art tries to “learn” from reality te-
levision, or takes Hartley’s call for “get together” too 
literally, there will arise a need for similar questions 
regarding surveillance, labour exploitation, women be-
ing traditionally linked to private and subjective sphe-
res, etc. Adding to this, is the question of whether the 
history of movie going and television viewing has not 
in fact taught us that the audience might find more 
truth in fiction, than in fact about fiction or fact about 
reality?
20. Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real (London: Verso, 
2002), 5.
21. Hartley, Television Truths, 252.
